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Abstract:  What is it to know the meaning of a word? The traditional view is that it involves the 
possession of a concept that determines the extension of a word, with the concept corresponding to a 
single psychological state. Millikan criticizes this view, denying not only that concepts determine 
extensions but also that sharing a concept means sharing a psychological state. The purpose of this 
paper is to defend a modified version of the traditional view. I argue that Millikan's claims do not 
translate directly into a thesis about word meaning. Her arguments relate to an extra-linguistic 
approach to extension, which we can distinguish from a linguistically oriented notion of extension. 
 
 
Understanding a word has often been viewed in terms of the possession of a shareable concept, 
such that (at least ideally) those who use a word will have the same concept as set down by some 
adult standard. This shared concept is also traditionally taken to correspond to a single 
psychological state and to play a role in 'determining the extension' of a word. That is to say, what 
is known in the knowing of a word is thought to provide a criterion for all and only the items to 
which the word truly applies.  
 Criticizing this approach, Putnam (1975) famously provided reasons for doubting that 
anything 'in the head' could determine an extension. More recently, Millikan has emphasized and 
reinforced the criticism of the traditional view. She has argued not only that extensions are not 
determined by anything in the head (indeed, she criticizes Putnam for not being externalist 
enough in this respect; see 2005, pp. 126–129),1 but also that a shared knowledge of a word—that 
is, shared grasp of a 'concept'—does not correlate with a single shared psychological state.  
 I will argue for a position that, at least in outline, corresponds to the traditional position, 
and yet which does not totally reject the externalist arguments that Millikan develops. A middle 
ground is possible when we make allowance for the fact that there is a specifically linguistic level 
of analysis that is not directly beholden to the type of extension that traditional accounts think can 
be explained, and externalist critiques think cannot be explained, in terms of shared concepts. I 
will suggest that we need to allow for two notions of determining an extension, one of which 
concerns broad metaphysical and conceptual questions that relate to the externalist arguments that 
Millikan puts forward, and the other of which relates to a narrower linguistic perspective that can 
be used to support a more traditional approach to word meaning. 																																																								
 	I would like to express thanks to Nick Shea and Laura Danon for helpful comments on an earlier 
version of the paper. Comments by two anonymous referees for this journal led to a further 
substantial improvement in the paper. The work was supported by an Arts and Humanities 
Research Council grant (AH/I000216/1), awarded to the project Word meaning: what it is and 
what it is not. 
 
1 All references are to Millikan unless otherwise noted.  
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 Millikan's discussion of externalism and concepts is fresh and often deeply critical of 
previous discussion. She has explicitly addressed the question of what is involved in knowing the 
meaning of a word, and, in part through a discussion of 'substance', she has made suggestions to 
help explain how children learn words so readily. I present and discuss the relevant aspects of her 
discussion, and I use this as a framework for establishing an account of word meaning that is 
contrary to the one Millikan supports.  
 In section 1 I discuss Millikan’s approach to 'substance' and also the contrasting notion of 
'class', and I argue that her externalist observations do not show that some notion of intension has 
no role to play. In section 2 I consider Millikan's specific approach to concepts, and I argue that, 
with respect to knowing a word, she is incorrect to deny a place for shared psychological states. 
In section 3 I support this position by suggesting that associating concepts with the ability to 
identify, which is central to Millikan’s account, is not the appropriate perspective for delineating 
linguistic understanding. In section 4 I suggest that we should distinguish two notions of what it 
means to determine an extension, one of which directly relates to linguistic meaning, and the 
other of which is more relevant to externalist considerations. 
 
1. Substances, classes, and a role for governing intensions2 
 
For Millikan, substance is an ontological category, but she typically gives her discussion of 
substance an epistemological emphasis (1984, p. 275; 2000, p. 26): 
 
Substances are those things about which you can learn from one encounter something of 
what to expect on other encounters, where this is no accident but the result of a real 
connection. (2000, p. 15) 
 
It is the 'real connection' that defines substance (Ryder et al. 2013, p. 131), though Millikan's 
emphasis on the epistemological consequence can sometimes obscure this. Real connections hold 
between the members of a substance, and because of these connections the members have 
likenesses to one another. Hence the consequence that you can learn from one encounter what to 
expect from other encounters.  
 There are different kinds of connection, and Millikan distinguishes three kinds of 
substance depending on the type of connection that is found between the members (2000, ch. 2; 																																																								
2 For the substance/class distinction, see in particular 2000, ch. 3; 2005, ch. 6. The distinction is 
Millikan’s own and does not correspond to normal usage. In particular, her use of ‘class term’ and 
‘classifier’ should not be confused with the use of ‘classifier’ in linguistics to indicate a type of 
adjective (or use thereof) in which it contrasts with ‘qualitative’. Classifying uses of adjectives 
indicate membership of a group and are not graded. We say ‘an annual event’ but not ‘a very 
annual event’. Qualitative uses of adjectives are gradable, as in ‘a very exciting event’. An 
adjective can be used in both ways, as with ‘a green melon’ used to classify the melon (it is not a 
red melon), and ‘a very green melon’ where it is used to indicate something about the colour of 
the melon (cf. Kennedy and McNally, 2010). Millikan’s notion of classifying terms corresponds 
more nearly to the qualitative use, while her notion of substance terms corresponds more to the 
classifier use. 
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2005, pp. 109–111). There are 'historical kinds' (such as dogs and chairs), 'eternal kinds' (stuffs 
such as gold and water), and 'individual kinds' (such as a particular person).  
 Historical kinds are substances whose members are connected to one another by 
causal/historical relations. These relations will typically ground important likenesses between the 
members. For example, members of a species will be alike either, on the basis of asexual 
reproduction, due to being clones of one another or, with sexual reproduction, due to stability 
(homeostasis) in the gene pool, this being caused by selection pressure on the characteristics that 
individuals of that species need to have in order to survive. Hence, blood-relatedness ‘is bound to 
be accompanied by considerable overlap in properties’ (2005, p. 107). As well as biological 
species, Millikan notes that artifacts also can constitute historical kinds. For example, chairs 
constitute a historical kind, chairs being related to one another through shared function, through 
the shared requirements of fitting human dimensions and preferences, and through usually being 
reproduced by copying rather than designed from scratch (2000, pp. 20f.). With eternal kinds, 
instances are alike not due to factors about reproduction but due to something like a shared inner 
structure, such as molecular structure, that ‘results in a certain selection of properties’ (2005, p. 
110). This explains why one bit of gold is much like any other bit of gold. An individual 
substance, such as a person, retains many of its properties over time due to ‘natural conservation 
laws’ that tend to ‘preserve its properties from day to day’ (2005, p. 111). 
 By describing the connections as real, Millikan intends to convey that they exist 
independently of anything in our heads. Connections between weasels, or pieces of gold, or an 
individual over different times, occur because of causal factors that inhere in the world.  
 It is because there are reasons for uniformities between instances of a substance that we 
can learn, from one encounter with a substance, what to expect from other encounters with that 
substance. The reasons typically support a considerable degree of uniformity: from encountering 
one weasel, or one bit of gold, or Alex on one occasion, you can learn a huge amount about what 
to expect from other weasels, other bits of gold, or Alex on other occasions. By contrast, 
encounter with a red thing does not teach you much, if anything at all, about what to expect from 
encounters with other red things, beyond redness. This is because there are no real connections 
between red things. Red things do not constitute a substance. 
 Millikan describes the epistemological consequence of the real connections as one of 
'inductive potential'. Studying one instance of a member of a substance ‘is likely to yield a 
considerable amount of probable knowledge’ about another instance (2005, p. 107f.). From 
studying one weasel, we will learn a great deal about what other weasels are like. Such substances 
display ‘rich inductive potential’ (2000, p. 17). By contrast, there is no rich inductive potential 
from studying a particular red thing: from studying a tomato we will not learn much about 
London buses and rubies. 
 Classes are defined in such a way that they do not display the rich inductive potential that 
Millikan typically associates with substances. ‘Classes are defined by the members having certain 
common properties’ (2005, p. 107).3 That is to say, there is a property or set of properties that is 
correctly diagnostic of all and only the members of a group. There need be no reason why that 
collection of items constitutes a group besides a decision that those properties will be diagnostic 																																																								
3 Fuzzy classes are defined by members having overlapping properties or by having many 
properties in common with a paradigm (2005, p. 107). 
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in this way. The class of red things, for example, consists of all items that share the property of 
being red. While there will be reasons why instances of a substance may display some, and 
perhaps very many, likenesses, there is probably no reason why one red object ‘should tend to be 
like the next [red object] in any respect other than redness’ (2005, p. 108). If an item is described 
as red, we perhaps cannot, by virtue of that classification in itself, retrieve any more information 
about the item than is already contained in the classification (cf. 2000, p. 37). While there is a 
vast body of knowledge about weasels, there is no accumulated body of knowledge about red 
things. 
 On this basis, Millikan states, incautiously, that ‘mere classes are not things one can learn 
anything at all about by induction’ (2005, p. 108). This is misleading, for the way classes are 
defined does not rule out the possibility that properties used to classify can, at least sometimes, 
ground uniformities. This will occur where some generalization is evident in the conditions that 
accompany an instance’s manifesting a given classifying property. Taking up an example from 
Cangelosi and Parisi (1998), Millikan herself notes that white things ‘get dirty easily, … show up 
easily in dim light, stay cool in sunlight, but also tend to blind us, and so forth’ (2000, p. 27). 
Even if the instances of white things have no connections to one another other than all being 
marked by the shared property of whiteness, this is consistent with there being non-accidental 
reasons for why some uniformities may, with at least some reliability, hold between members of 
the group.4  
 Conversely, while paradigm substance terms may display rich inductive potential, 
Millikan notes that there is ‘a long, graded continuum’, with substances varying widely in the 
reliability and multiplicity of the inferences they support (2000, p. 26). Encounter with one 
weasel provides considerable information about what the next weasel will be like. Encounter with 
one chair provides quite a lot of guidance about what the next chair may be like, but the range and 
reliability of inferences drawn from one chair to other chairs will be less than in the weasel case. 
Holidays5 also may be viewed as members of a historical kind: holidays display uniformities due 
to common purpose (the purpose of having a clear break and rest); there is a common constraint, 
from human needs and preferences, that influences how best that purpose can be satisfied; and 
there is reproduction by copying (we are influenced by past experience and the experience of 
																																																								
4 Confusingly, Millikan at one point responds to the way in which white things can support 
generalizations by indicating that ‘white’ can in fact act as a substance term, where it indicates 
white things (which have properties) rather than the property white (2000, p. 27). The suggestion 
is surprising. Her motivation for claiming a substance use of 'white' is the epistemological 
consequence rather than any real connection between white things. Millikan does not normally 
treat substances as including groupings that happen to display generalizations on account of a 
classifying property. Rather, substances are groupings based on ‘genuine ontological grounds’ 
(2000, p. 39), where these grounds are distinct from the classifying property itself. The 
ontological structures that makes something a substance are the historical/eternal/individual 
connections Millikan describes (see Ryder et al., 2013, p. 131). 
5 Millikan states that the category of substances may include 'certain event types', and she gives 
breakfast, dinner time, siesta time, and war, as examples. Other examples of substances include 
musical compositions, McDonalds, Californians, Western economies. See 2000, pp. 3, 26–7. 
	 5	
others in how we take holidays). Holidays support some degree of inductive potential, but less so 
than weasels given the diversity of the ways of taking a holiday.  
 While Millikan treats the substance/class distinction as one of kind, the categories are not 
mutually exclusive.6 The definition of a class makes reference merely to the presence of a 
property or set of properties that is correctly diagnostic of all and only members of a group. In 
itself, this definition is independent of whether or not a group has some real connection over and 
above the presence of a correct diagnostic. Hence, Millikan states:  
 
Eternal kinds do form classes, all of whose members are alike in a variety of respects. But 
they are also much more than mere classes, because they are alike in these respects not by 
accident but in accordance with a causal explanation. (2005, p. 110) 
 
Millikan is here explicitly allowing that a substance may also be a class. Gold is an eternal kind 
that inheres in the causal order, having a real connection based on a shared atomic structure; but it 
also turns out that the property of having atomic weight 79 is diagnostic of members of the group. 
 I suggest that we present Millikan's account in the following way. A class is a whole that 
is constituted by instances for which a given property or set of properties is diagnostic of all and 
only members of a group. A substance is a whole whose members are characterized by a 
connection that is independent of the presence, or absence, of a classifying diagnostic. The 
connection will display the historical, eternal, or individual factors that Millikan describes. This 
way of describing substance avoids some potentially misleading emphases that sometimes 
characterize Millikan's discussion, but we still have enough to capture the distinctions that I 
believe Millikan wants to preserve.  
 First, it indirectly accounts for the epistemic contrast between substances and classes, but 
without appearing to define substances and classes in terms of that potential.  
 Second, we capture an appropriate contrast between substance and class. They are not 
mutually exclusive, but it is not on that account inappropriate to say that a substance is different 
in kind from a class. A substance is never a mere class, even if a classifying condition can be 
formulated on the basis of what we happen to learn about a substance. 
 Third, the suggested definition does not place particular stress on substances whose 
identity can plausibly be viewed as largely determined by the causal order of the world. Millikan 
in practice tends to concentrate on types of example, such as weasels, for which inherence in the 
causal order of the world can be emphasized. This emphasis is not so relevant for groupings that 
do not naturally occur, such as holidays and chairs, but a generalization to such examples is 
required by Millikan's account (though this is sometimes obscured in her presentation). Millikan 
herself notes that many artifacts, for example, are ‘governed in part by intensions determining 
their extensions to contain things that have been made for certain uses’ (2010, p. 70). Chairs are 
historical kinds, but they do not constitute a naturally occurring group. Our purposes play a large 
role in determining them as a group, and this is a governance that, at least in part, is projected 																																																								
6 Some passages might appear to indicate otherwise. For example, she writes that words such as 
‘dog’, ‘chair’, ‘fruit’, ‘do not designate classes but units of another kind entirely’ (2005, p. 106); 
the kinds ‘that are substances in my sense are not classes’ (Ryder et al., 2013, p. 133). These are 
to be read, though, as indicating a distinction in kind without commitment to mutual exclusivity. 
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from our heads. I have phrased Millikan's account of substance, therefore, in a way that avoids 
particular emphasis on naturally occurring groupings. The definition merely requires that there be 
connections (historical, eternal, individual) between the members of the substance. These 
connections might themselves be related to requirements or roles that cannot be specified purely 
in terms of the world's causal structures (cf. Prinz, 2013). 
 We can still, though, maintain an important place for the role that is played by the 
external world, even where a projected condition has to be taken into account. Suppose that it is 
correct to look to some partially governing ‘intension’ with respect to chairs. I here construe 
'intension' in a relatively neutral and non-committal sense as indicating some kind of governing 
'thought about' chairs that may play a partial role with respect to the determination of extensions, 
but where the precise nature of that role is left open. For illustrative purposes, I will construe this 
intension as the requirement that a chair be something that plays the role of providing a sitting 
possibility, with back support, for one person (this is intended as an approximation that is 
sufficiently accurate for illustrative purposes). While this is projected on the basis of our own 
requirements, it does not follow that how chairs are manifested in the sensible world is likewise 
projected from our heads. It will be a matter of exploration and discovery on our part to find out 
what materials and what designs are appropriate for manifesting the requirement that chairs 
should meet. This will in part depend on the nature of our bodies and the various kinds of sitting 
that are required for different purposes. These constraining factors are not themselves determined 
by the proposed intension. There is also a historical factor: chairs may be reproduced by copying, 
so how chairs are manifested will be locally influenced by tastes and traditions. There are, 
therefore, many external factors that influence the construction and design of chairs. These 
factors are not projected from our heads.  
 We can, therefore, distinguish external from internal factors when discussing words and 
the items those words are used of. This distinction should play a role in an account of linguistic 
meaning. As I will describe in the next section, Millikan tends to underplay the requirements for 
‘knowing the meaning’ of a word because she not only focuses on the externally determined 
features of a category, but she also illustrates her account by choosing substance words (such as 
'weasel') that lean heavily towards worldly based causal determinations. If we look, instead, to 
partially governing intensions, there is a place for a shared psychological state, and I will argue 
that linguistic understanding relates to this perspective rather than to the externally based factors 
that Millikan stresses.   
  
 
2. Concepts and conceptions   
 
There is, Millikan remarks, a traditional view that learning what a word means ‘is coming to 
exercise the “same concept” in connection with the word that adults do’ (2000, p. 92). Further, 
this shared concept is traditionally seen as corresponding to a single psychological state (2005, p. 
134). The natural order of exposition here is from some prior intuitions or commitments about 
word meanings to a notion of ‘concept’ that will play the role indicated by those commitments. 
Millikan is, implicitly, deeply critical of this, and I interpret this as arising both from not wanting 
to be committed at the outset to a particular notion of linguistic meaning and from not wanting to 
be saddled with a traditional notion of concepts. Millikan reworks the notion of a concept into a 
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form that she is happy with,7 and on that basis she provides a reassessment as to what an account 
of linguistic meaning should look like. 
 Millikan defines a concept as an ability to identify: ‘One’s concept of a thing might be 
described as one’s ability to identify that thing …’ (1984, p. 253). A given substance, such as a 
particular person or historical kind, may appear to us in many different guises and under many 
different perspectives and conditions. If we are to accumulate knowledge about the substance, we 
need to have the ability to reidentify the same substance ‘through diverse media and under 
diverse conditions’ (2000, p. 2). It is precisely the task of concept formation to enable us ‘to 
recognize what is objectively the same through enormous diversity of appearances’ (2005, p. 
131). 
 This emphasis is very clearly shown in Millikan’s application of this task analysis of 
concepts to more generalized abilities to identify constancies across variation, such as the ability 
to reidentify three-dimensional forms from different angles or the ability to identify colours under 
a variety of lighting conditions (1984, p. 255; 2005, p. 67). These abilities are concepts, just as 
our abilities to reidentify weasels or gold or Alex are concepts. 
 Abilities can be individuated in different ways. A child and a chemist both have the 
ability to identify sugar, and in this sense they share an ability. But the chemist has more 
sophisticated and reliable means for identifying sugar than the child, and in this sense they differ 
in abilities. Millikan introduces terminology to mark this distinction: the chemist and child have, 
in one sense, the same ‘concept’; but in another sense they differ, and Millikan typically marks 
this by speaking of different ‘conceptions’ (2000, p. 11).8  Conceptions are the particular means 
used, whereas concepts are the abilities individuated by whatever it is that is identified. Concepts 
are not individuated by reliability. Even if the child is unreliable compared with the chemist in 
identifying sugar, there is a sense in which they both have the same ‘sugar’ concept as long as 
they can both identify sugar.  
 Millikan speaks of what is required in order to understand a word in terms of grasping a 
concept, but with her own take on concepts she is also able to reject the claim that this 
corresponds to a shared psychological state. For two children to share the concept of their mother 
is for them both to have the ability to identify her. But their methods might vary—one might use 
sight, the other sound—and in this respect they have different conceptions of their mother. 
Millikan suggests that what have traditionally been called concepts are in many ways like her 
conceptions (2000, p. 12), and her emphasis on the method of identifying shows how one concept 
can go along with different psychological states.  
 
																																																								
7 There is the suggestion that she will replace the term ‘concept’ with ‘unicept’ to help avoid 
unwelcome connotations (see Ryder et al., 2013, p. ix.). 
8 Millikan in fact expresses hesitation about the extent to which it is true that different people may 
have the same concept. She treats concepts as ‘personal possessions, components of individual 
people’s psychologies. We each have our own concepts’ (Ryder et al., 2013, p. 256). But she also 
allows for a level of individuation at which it is appropriate to talk of sameness (ibid., pp. 131–
132), and it is in this way that I will speak of concepts. 
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Is there such a thing as 'THE adult conception' of a substance? Given the numerous and 
diverse methods by which it is possible to learn to identify almost any substance, it seems 
that there could not possibly be. (2000, p. 93) 
 
To know the meaning of a word is to have the appropriate concept. It follows that the meanings 
of at least many words ‘are not determined by methods of application that are necessarily 
common to all competent users’ (2010, p. 45). A word meaning need not correspond to a single 
psychological state across users. 
 In other words, by treating the topic of what it is to know a word in terms of ability to 
identify, and by allowing for different methods of identification, Millikan can argue that the 
methods people have of using a word need not be shared. While people may share the same 
‘concept’—this being individuated in terms of the substance identified—this is consistent with 
there being no shared psychological state that underpins this ability. A second conclusion is that 
the methods people use need not provide a correct diagnostic for all and only members of the 
substance. The extension of weasels is determined by the causal structure of the world. Our 
method of identifying provides a more or less reliable technique for deciding whether or not 
something is a weasel, but the property or set of properties we use for this purpose does not 
determine the extension.  
 The reasoning supports, therefore, the two central claims Millikan makes about an 
account of what is involved in ‘knowing the meaning’ of a word: knowing the meaning does not 
correspond to a particular psychological state nor to something that determines the extension of 
the word.9 On the other hand, the examples that most clearly support these claims come from 
terms for naturally occurring groupings, such as ‘weasel’. I will argue that the emphasis that 
arises from consideration of terms such as 'weasel' is misleading with respect to those substance 
words used for groupings that are accounted for, at least in part, in terms of what we project from 
our heads. And as the claims are based on a consideration of substances, we might expect that the 
two claims do not apply to words that are used for the diagnostic properties typical of classes. 
 Millikan, though, takes her account to be general across all substance terms. Further, by 
offering an account of how such terms are learnt (described below), she suggests that her account 
offers insight into the general problem of word acquisition, the problem of how ‘it is possible for 
small children to learn, as Chomsky puts it … “a word an hour” between 18 months and 6 years 
of age’ (2005, p. 119; 2010, p. 46).  
 Millikan’s explanation for how substance terms are acquired is based on the claim that 
substance terms act very much like (proper) names. Names are easy to acquire, and acquiring 
them does not seem to correspond to any particular degree of knowledge about the item named. 
																																																								
9 Millikan stresses discontinuity, rather than continuity, with Putnam's views (Putnam, 1975). 
Putnam appears to allow that the extension of a word can be determined by what is in the heads 
of experts. As Millikan notes (2005, p. 128), all he need be taken to be denying is that what is in 
the head of a typical individual determines the extension. Further, with respect to what is in the 
head with regard to a word, Putnam supports a view (a stereotype approach to concepts) that is 
consistent with the claim that there is a shared psychological state corresponding to knowledge of 
the word. 
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 Individual persons are paradigm examples of individual substances (2000, pp. 23–4). If 
we think of the name of a particular person, there is a sense in which we learn to associate that 
name—that is, the name understood as naming that person—with whatever knowledge we may 
have happened to accumulate about that person. In talking of Plato, we are talking of an 
individual substance about which a body of knowledge has gathered. We carry this knowledge 
forward to subsequent discussions about Plato, and typically these discussions will be indicated 
by use of the term ‘Plato’. The name itself does not denote any particular property or set of 
properties. It does, though, act as a locus of identification in the sense that, when that particular 
name is iterated, we tune in to the fact that it is the named individual substance that we are talking 
about. We will then draw on some facet or other of what we know of that substance in order to 
contribute to the discussion. 
 Words used for naming individual substances are very easily learnt. You can initiate a 
discussion about someone you know, say Markus, by the purely verbal means of simply using the 
name ‘Markus’. Your hearers may know little or nothing about Markus, but they will be able to 
pick up on the name and use it to continue talking about Markus. One of the roles that Millikan 
gives to a concept of Z is that of being the condition for thinking of Z (e.g. 2005, p. 112). So, if 
being able to talk about Markus involves being able to think about Markus, you must have a 
concept of Markus. This concept provides both what is required in order to count as knowing the 
meaning of this name ‘Markus’ and what is required in order to think of Markus. Because 
concepts are construed in terms of an ability to identify, it follows that this easy ability we have to 
pick up on a name such as ‘Markus’ also gives us an ability to identify and reidentify Markus. 
Millikan allows for this by suggesting that a response to a substance term is itself a method of 
identifying. The idea is that when we recognize that a series of uses of ‘Markus’ are referring to 
one individual, in such a way that we realize that everything we learn about some Markus or other 
can be grouped together as pertaining to a single individual substance, we are thereby 
reidentifying this individual substance in each encounter with ‘Markus’. We can, in other words, 
learn how to reidentify a substance purely through learning that an iterated term corresponds, in 
each use, to a particular unit around which we accumulate knowledge.  
 
In many cases there is not much more to having a substance concept than having a word. 
To have a word is to have a handle on tracking a substance via manifestations of it 
produced in a particular language community. (2000, p. 90) 
 
In the next section I criticize the appeal that is made to reidentification in our response to a word, 
but the conclusion I take to be correct: it takes very little to think about something, maybe nothing 
more, in the limit, than a response to a naming word.  
 It is easy to introduce such words, and we can extend the point beyond names for 
individual substances. The tectum, pretectum, and pons are regions of the brain. Pseudomyxoma 
peritonei, trichopoliodystrophy, and neuromyelitis optica are names of diseases. By this simple 
introduction, I have handed you six concepts that you may not have had before (cf. 2000, p. 94, 
where Millikan hands us the concept of African dormice). In Millikan’s terminology, you now 
have the ability to track these substances in discussion. This ability constitutes what it is to 
possess the respective concepts, irrespective of the fact that you may know very little about the 
named substances. In particular, there is no need to look to some adult standard, some relatively 
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expert knowledge of how to identify any of these substances, in order to justify the claim that you 
can use these words to talk about these substances. Because we are able to recognize a substance 
‘merely by learning a word for it’, Millikan takes this as explanatory for ‘why it is possible for 
small children to learn … “a word an hour” between 18 months and 6 years of age’ (2005, p. 
119). 
 In spite of these claims, two facts stand out. First, this account is most easily motivated 
by particular examples of substance words—exemplified here by words for diseases, species, and 
regions of the brain, but generalizing to words for natural groupings, discovered and delineated in 
scientific inquiry, about which typical language users may have very limited knowledge—that 
have characteristics that are not shared by the majority of substance words that we use in 
everyday speech. Second, while there is a sense in which this type of substance word is easy to 
learn, it is also a type of word that can lead to barriers to comprehension.  
 These two points can be shown by consideration of any typical text. If you run through 
practically any text and count the clear examples of words that name a particular species, or 
disease, or relatively abstruse part of the body, or some other distinction that reflects quite 
specialist knowledge and that points to a natural grouping discovered by science, such words will 
almost always be in a very small minority and often may not occur at all. Texts that contain a fair 
proportion of such words are noticeable precisely because they are unusual. They are also 
noticeable because they are, typically, forbidding and opaque to most readers, irrespective of how 
easily the words, taken individually, can be acquired. For example, consider the following 
passage:  
 
The neuroanatomical substrates for this organization are association cortices of different 
orders, both sensory and motor, some limbic structures (entorhinal cortex, hippocampus, 
amygdala, cingulate cortices), and the nestriatum/cerebellum, which constitute the 
substrate for convergence zones. (Taken, slightly altered, from Damasio, 1989) 
 
This passage is forbidding largely because of the relatively high proportion of words—though 
even here they are in a minority—that induce a problem because readers have only an outline 
grasp of the substances spoken of. The ease we have in picking up such words, which Millikan 
emphasizes, does not offset this. Compare how, in ordinary conversation, if your interlocutor 
starts naming various people whom you do not know, the ease we may display in picking up such 
names does not offset the communicative block that use of the names may induce. In spite of the 
way in which names can indeed be easy to introduce, they also place a burden on memory and 
knowledge that can make them difficult to process.  
 We find relief in words that are not proper names and that do not act to label items about 
which we are largely ignorant. Yet by tending to use such words when illustrating her thesis, 
Millikan arguably introduces an emphasis that is not appropriate for the majority of substance 
words that we actually use in discourse. In other words, it may be misleading to describe what is 
involved in knowing the meaning of a word when the motivating examples tend to be words like 
‘weasel’ and ‘tectum’. 
 In particular, as I have already argued, for many words that can be taken to denote 
substances, such as ‘holiday’ and ‘chair’, there is a clear motivation for appealing to some sort of 
governing intension that, arguably, needs to be grasped before the words are properly understood. 
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By concentrating on natural groupings, about which many speakers of English are highly 
ignorant, Millikan underplays this. If we emphasize our general ignorance, we can see what 
motivates Millikan to put an emphasis on merely 'having a word', and being able to track its use, 
as sufficient for grasping a substance concept. This emphasis leads away from any clear 
motivation to posit a shared governing intension. A motivation is much more clearly seen when 
we shift the type of substance word that we consider. 
 In practice, Millikan herself does not treat substance words, even for natural groupings, 
as mere placeholders for a ‘something we know almost nothing of’ about which a body of 
knowledge accumulates. She also states that, as well as ability to identify, there is a second pole 
to a substance concept, namely, grasp of a ‘substance template’ (2000, p. 73). The intuition is that 
if you ask ‘What shape is gold?’ or ‘What atomic number does a weasel have?’ you show that 
you do not grasp the concepts of gold and weasels at all. Knowing a concept at least involves 
knowing what sort of questions it makes sense to ask.  
 It is not clear how substance templates fit into Millikan’s overall account. They seem to 
answer to an important aspect of what it is to understand a word, in that for most, and perhaps all, 
words, an understanding of a word plausibly requires some understanding of what the word is 
used of. And yet this already takes us beyond the emphasis in which substance words are mere 
labels (and initially learnt as such) for some item about which our knowledge can grow. The 
appeal to substance templates suggests that Millikan recognizes a lacuna in her account. I take 
Millikan’s mention of substance templates, along with the role she allows, with at least some 
words, for a partially governing ‘intension’ (2010, p. 70), as symptomatic of a requirement for a 
different type of account for expounding what it is to know the meaning of a word. 
 With respect to psychological states and extensions, Millikan makes the same claims for 
class words as she does for substance words: knowing the meaning of a class word does not 
correlate with a shared psychological state or with something that determines an extension. The 
basis for these claims, though, is somewhat different than the one used for substance words. 
 Millikan's claims about class words are, initially, surprising. Given how Millikan 
introduced the substance/class distinction, we might expect there to be straightforward disanalogy 
between what is involved in knowing the meaning of a class term and what is involved in 
knowing the meaning of a substance term. Sometimes Millikan herself appears to indicate this.  
She writes: ‘Because substances are not classes … to have a concept of a certain substance is not 
to have a certain set of properties in mind’ (2005, p. 112). This suggests, by the implied contrast, 
that to have a concept of a class is to have a certain set of properties in mind, namely, the 
properties in terms of which the class is defined. Further, Millikan expounds the claim that 
‘substance concepts are not just classifiers’ as the claim that ‘conceptions of substances are not 
what determine the extensions of their corresponding concepts …’ (2000, p. 48). Again, the 
implied contrast suggests that when we are dealing with class terms, a conception that identifies 
some property (and we might expect the conception to correspond to a shared psychological state) 
does determine the extension of the class. Thus, we might expect Millikan to describe class 
concepts as corresponding to a shared psychological state that determines extensions.  
 But Millikan does not speak of class concepts in this way. Millikan supports a different 
conclusion about class terms by making use of the fine-grained ways in which methods of 
identifying can be individuated. Millikan allows conceptions to be individuated in terms of the 
precise method used to identify a particular property. I might identify weasels by their shape, but 
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I can do this by touch as well as by sight. This can count as two conceptions of weasels. To 
understand ‘square’ it is enough if a child can recognize squares, but there are different ways of 
doing this: the child can use sight, hands, feet, and so on (cf. 2010, p. 62).  We can come to 
appreciate a distance (in this sense identify a distance) by ocular disparity, by tension in the 
focusing muscles of the eye, by partial occlusion of one object by another, by the known size of 
objects, by atmospheric haze, and so on (2005, p. 67).  
 On this basis, Millikan makes two claims that largely parallel what is claimed for 
substance terms: there is an absence of ‘an agreed-upon decisive method for determining 
extension’ even for paradigm class terms (see 2010, p. 50); and, given this, these terms ‘do not 
have defining handed-down methods of application’ (2010, p. 62). Millikan seems to have two 
points in mind: there are different methods (for identifying squares, for example), without any 
one method in particular being marked out by the community; and, for each method, our abilities 
in implementing it are fallible (touch, for example, would not in practice enable us to identify a 
very large square object). Hence, there is no one method that determines the extension, where 
‘determining an extension’ is construed in terms of identifying all and only members of the class.  
 But from a different perspective both points can be denied without strain. It is plausible to 
maintain a distinction between, on the one hand, the differing skills and techniques that we may 
in practice use for identifying squares, and, on the other, a shared notion of what squareness 
consists in.10 By focussing on the precise methods of identification used, Millikan ignores the role 
for something that is shared in our understanding of 'square'. And given that the property of 
squareness determines the class, there is a sense in which we can say that our concept of 
squareness determines the extension. This is to treat ‘determining an extension’ not in terms of 
the actual identifications we are in a position to make but in terms of a correlation between square 
items and our understanding of the word 'square'.11 
 I do not think, therefore, that Millikan has given compelling reasons to treat class 
concepts in the way she does. There are grounds for the claim that class concepts display both 
characteristics that Millikan is keen to deny: they correspond to shared psychological states, and 
they determine the extension of the class. 
 
3. Understanding and identification 
 
Millikan argues for a close relation between an account of what is required to understand a term 
and the ability to identify that which a term denotes. There are, though, reasons to deny that this 
close relation holds.  
 When we recognize that a series of uses of a substance term is referring to one kind of 
substance, such that everything we learn in that series of uses can be grouped together as 
pertaining to a single substance, Millikan says that we are thereby reidentifying this individual 
substance in each encounter with the substance term. For example, if we recognize that uses of 																																																								
10 I share an understanding of breaststroke with other swimmers, having studied the stroke using 
videos and information from the internet. My skill at implementing that knowledge, and the 
precise way I implement it, differs though very much from that of other swimmers. 
11 This introduces a distinction between ‘conception’ and the hands-on implementation of a 
method of identifying. This distinction is developed in section 3 of this paper. 
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‘molybdenum’ pertain to a single substance, we thereby reidentify molybdenum each time we 
encounter ‘molybdenum’. Describing this in terms of an ability to reidentify is, though, somewhat 
strained. I can identify that an item (whether described or perceived) is a piece of molybdenum, 
and I can identify that a situation (whether described or perceived) is caused by molybdenum. It 
is not implausible to describe this as an ability to identify and reidentify molybdenum. But to 
identify and reidentify that you are talking about molybdenum on the basis of hearing the word 
‘molybdenum’ is not, prima facie, to reidentify molybdenum. A more obvious explanation is that 
it is simply to understand the word ‘molybdenum’, and that this is distinct from the more 
demanding ability involved in recognizing that such-and-such is a piece of molybdenum or that 
such-and-such was influenced by the presence of molybdenum.  
 Millikan does argue for her point, on independent grounds, by suggesting that hearing a 
word for a substance is just as direct a way of perceiving the substance as when we react to the 
light reflected off an instance of the substance itself. Hearing a word, Millikan suggests, is just 
another form in which information about a thing arrives at our sensory surfaces (see 2000, ch. 6; 
2004, ch. 9). This in turn depends on the claim that a word is a bearer of a type of natural 
information (see 2004, chs. 3, 6, 8). In Millikan’s sense, an intentional sign, such as a monkey’s 
alarm call, will bear natural information about eagles (say) when the use of the call correlates 
well enough with actual instances of eagles for it to be profitable for the community of monkeys 
to use and respond to the sign in the appropriate manner (evasive behaviour). The continued use 
of the call by the monkeys is explained by a semantic mapping (a mapping to the presence of an 
eagle) that accounts for the monkeys’ response to the sign. Even if the call does not always 
correctly correlate with instances of eagles, it does so often enough to explain why the sign, and 
the corresponding response, is replicated in the monkey community. The background idea is that 
signs are effective when they lead to behaviour that is adapted to the 'existence of the signified 
affairs' (2004, p. 76)—here, behaviour adapted to the presence of an eagle.  
 Millikan extends this general picture to the words of natural language: linguistic items are 
'the parade cases of intentional signs' (2004, p. 45), and words for substances survive when tokens 
of a word type are replicated on the basis of a semantic mapping that is often enough satisfied to 
explain why the sign is used as it is. Use of ‘dog’, for example, on this account, is maintained 
because of a semantic mapping, to instances of dogs, that is often enough satisfied for the 
continued use of ‘dog’ to be worthwhile. The word 'dog' is 'informative' in the sense that it 
correlates sufficiently with instances of dogs so as to lead to behaviour that is adapted to the 
presence of a dog. 
 This is a surprising claim. While Millikan's discussion of monkey calls, and the like, is 
convincing, she does not provide clear reasons for extending the approach to an account of 
individual words of a language. In the following passage, we do not so much get a reason for the 
claim as a sleight of hand in which two differing senses of 'information' appear to be at work: 
 
Consider, for example, a speaker whose purpose in using the word ‘dog’ is to 
communicate about or to call attention to facts that concern dogs. … Such a speaker will 
eventually stop trying to use the word ‘dog’ for this purpose if there is no evidence that it 
ever has this effect on hearers. Similarly, a hearer whose language-understanding 
faculties turn his mind to dogs with the purpose of collecting information about dogs 
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whenever speakers use the word ‘dog’ will soon unlearn this response if speakers never 
use the word ‘dog’ such that it carries information about dogs. (2004, p. 25) 
 
On the face of it, this passage seems uncontroversial, appearing to say nothing more than that use 
of 'dog' as a word for dogs will die out if the community does not use it to speak about dogs. To 
'convey information', in this sense, means nothing more than conveying 'facts that concern dogs'. 
But when, at the end of the passage, Millikan states that use of the word 'dog' should (with some 
appropriate frequency) be 'such that it carries information about dogs', she is in fact claiming that 
use of 'dog' will die out if it does not carry natural information about dogs. That is to say, 'dog' 
will be preserved in use only if its use correlates appropriately with states of affairs in which a 
dog is instantiated. This is to 'convey information' in the sense of providing an appropriately 
robust indication of the presence of a dog in the vicinity. The passage seems innocent, but it is in 
fact making a substantial and controversial claim.12   
 Prima facie, our continued use of ‘dog’ does not depend on the existence of an 
appropriate frequency of correlations between use of 'dog' and occurrences of instances of dogs, 
given that our response to the word need not involve an appropriate behavioural adaptation to the 
presence of a dog. For many terms, the continued use of which need not be in doubt, it may be the 
case that there are no such correlations at all or that what a correlation may amount to is unclear. 
For 'Plato', any correlations are restricted to the past; for 'Higgs boson' and 'dark energy', it is far 
from obvious what it might mean for a use of these terms to correlate with an instance; and for 
'ether', a term still in use, there are no such correlations.  
 Yet it is a link to natural information that underpins Millikan's suggestion that 
understanding a substance word can be construed in terms of identifying instances of the 
substance. Consider how we may speak of an expert as identifying the presence of an eagle on the 
basis of hearing a particular bird sound or particular call given by a monkey. If, though, we 
remove the link to natural information, we thereby remove any obvious motivation for focusing 
on identification. 
 Positive reasons for distinguishing, in our understanding of a word, a factor that is not 
elucidated directly in terms of methods of identification can be provided from considerations 
already given. As noted, Millikan allows that we may share an intension that plays some sort of 
governing role with respect to the chair substance. For ‘chair’ I have suggested, as an illustrative 
approximation, something that provides a sitting possibility with back support for one person. But 
even if we do hypothesize this as a governing intension, it is not itself a method of identification 
nor does it determine those methods. While the intension is projected on the basis of our own 
requirements, it does not follow that how chairs are manifested in the sensible world is likewise 
projected from our heads; hence, it does not follow that the method we use to identify a chair 
follows directly from our grasp of the intension itself. It will be a matter of exploration and 
discovery on our part to find out what materials and what designs are appropriate, and locally 
used, for manifesting the requirement that chairs should meet. We become sensitive, at least for 
the chairs in our own culture, to the perceptible characteristics of chairs as determined by these 																																																								
12 This interpretation is not self-evident from the quotation itself, but it follows from Millikan's 
extensive discussion elsewhere. For the link between 'conveying information' and natural 
information, see 2004, ch. 3.  
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external factors. Where we identify the presence of such characteristics, we use them as a 
normally reliable diagnostic for indicating the presence of a chair. But these methods of 
identification, which may vary between people, are not themselves determined by the governing 
intension. Neither do these methods determine the extension. 
 We can, in other words, combine a claim about a shared understanding, hypothesized to 
correlate with a shared psychological state, with an observation about the multiplicity of methods 
of identifying.  
 The examples illustrate the consistency of positing a shared understanding of a word—
where this understanding is adequate for providing an answer to what is required to ‘know the 
meaning’—while allowing for more complex factors that play a role in ‘determining the 
extension’. In effect, this is to posit a distinction between what is required to understand a word 
and what is required to identify how a word is being applied in a given instance. A shared 
intension (correlating with a shared psychological state) is consistent with different ways of 
identifying.13  
 
4. Determining extensions 
 
Finally, I would like to suggest that there is an important ambiguity in what might be meant by 
‘determining an extension’ with respect to substance words. 
 On the one hand, there is the notion of a comprehensive decision as to which items in the 
world are such and such (weasels or chairs, for example). Such a (putative) decision may be 
informed by complex considerations, whether biological, in the case of weasels, or perhaps 
relating (inter alia) to whether or not 'real' chairs should always be artifacts.  
 We can distinguish this from a second notion of extension, which I phrase in terms of the 
range of applications that is 'linguistically licensed' by a word. Extension in this second sense is 
determined solely by the word's linguistic meaning, without taking into account the broader 
criteria that relate to the first sense of extension.  
 A similar distinction is implicit in a great deal of work on the context sensitivity of 
language. Bringing the distinction to attention helps create a space for a notion of linguistic 
meaning in which the meanings of an important spectrum of words, including substance words, 
do determine extensions.  
 We may reasonably doubt that there will always be a correct way, even in principle, of 
determining extensions in the first sense. Perhaps there is some relatively clear fact of the matter 
with respect to which mammals belong to the weasel substance, though even this will be 
susceptible to decisions as to what delineates a particular biological classification. With chairs, 
we may even more reasonably doubt that there is a fact of the matter, waiting there to be 
discovered, as to which items in the world precisely constitute the set of all chairs. For example, 
is there a fact of the matter as to whether a suitably arranged pile of suitcases, or a suitable tree 
stump, can truly count as being a chair? Most chairs, of course, are artifacts, constructed 																																																								
13 Represented as functions from worlds to extensions (Montague, 1970), intensions do not 
directly indicate methods of identifying. A connection may have been suggested by, first, the 
association of intensions with Fregean senses (Carnap, 1956) and, second, interpreting grasp of a 
Fregean sense as an ability to identify (cf. Dummett, 1978, p. 130). 
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deliberately for the chair purpose. It does not follow that there will be a principled basis on which 
to make a final decision as to whether an item, in order for it to really be a chair, has to be an 
artifact, and deliberately constructed for the chair purpose.14 
 The second notion of extension depends on the suggestion that what is involved in 
'knowing the meaning' of a word provides a criterion for use that allows for a wider degree of 
application than might be warranted when we take into account the specific requirements and 
concerns that may be operative in a given context of use. To take just a single example from the 
many that theorists have discussed, Sperber and Wilson (1998) note that if Mary asks Peter to 
open the washing machine  
 
she will probably be asking him to open the lid of the machine. However, if Peter is a 
plumber, she might be asking him to unscrew the back … (p. 186) 
 
The word 'open' fits, linguistically speaking, to either use, but one use rather than another may be 
appropriate in a given situation. Correspondingly, if the washing machine is described as 'open', 
the relevant state of the washing machine that justifies this description may vary depending on 
whether we are addressing an engineer or a laundry person. When addressing a laundry person, it 
may be deemed false, or at least inappropriate, to describe the machine as open if the back has 
been unscrewed but the drum is still shut. The word 'open' taken by itself does not answer to these 
further questions as to whether a particular use is appropriate. 
 Theorists differ over whether inappropriateness of use corresponds to falsity. That is to 
say, is it false, as well as inappropriate, to say 'The washing machine is open' when addressing 
someone wanting to do the laundry, if only the back of the machine is open? Borg (2004), for 
example, distinguishes what it is to grasp an element of a truth condition (for which read, in my 
terms, 'know a word meaning') from what is required to verify whether and how the condition is 
manifested in a particular instance. Borg would not, though, see inappropriate use as giving rise 
to falsity, given that she takes truth only to require consistency with the element of the 'truth 
condition' that a particular word conveys. 
 I abstract from the debate as to whether truth and falsity, or merely inappropriateness, is 
at issue. The substantive point remains: the range of applications that a word in principle allows 
for may be wider than the range of applications that are appropriate/true for a given use. It is this 
distinction that I wish to capture by the two notions of extension. 
 Examples can easily be found from our use of substance words. For example, consider 
'poison' and 'milk'. There can be contexts in which these words would not be appropriately used 
(and might be said to be used falsely) of items that in other contexts could appropriately receive 
these predications. What is linguistically allowable, so to speak, may be broader than what is 
allowable given further considerations. Vitamin D can be used as rat poison, but it will often not 																																																								
14 Many paths are artifacts, but items do not have to be artifacts in order to truly be paths. In 
general, I see no reason to believe that artifact status is encoded at the linguistic level for 
individual words. Even given an assumption about artifactual status, there are complexities 
involved with making decisions on the sortal identity of a given artifact. See the editorial 
introduction (Carrara and Mingardo, 2013) to the special edition of Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology 2013, vol. 3(4); also Thomasson, 2007.  
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be appropriate, and may be deemed false, to describe vitamin D as a poison. There are many 
stuffs for which the term 'milk' is linguistically licensed but which, in some contexts, may be 
deemed as not in fact examples of milk at all (e.g. almond milk, rice milk, and so on).  
 To further illustrate this distinction, consider the suggestion, already used, that 'chair' is 
linguistically licensed to apply to items that offer a sitting possibility, with back support, for one. 
By hypothesis, there would be no linguistic error in using 'chair' of a pile of suitcases or tree 
stump, as long as they provide a sitting possibility, with back support, for one. This would not, 
though, rule out the possibility that further debate might arise as to whether these really are 
chairs. This debate might arise for practical, cultural, or legal reasons that are not themselves 
addressed by the linguistic specification. By hypothesis, and I think highly plausibly, the 
participants in the debate would share the same understanding of the word 'chair' but would make 
different judgements about further aspects of application. 
 If this suggestion is on the right lines, we can distinguish broad metaphysical and 
conceptual discussions about what things 'really are' weasels and chairs (the first sense of 
determining an extension, with the 'really are' corresponding to perhaps complex judgements 
relating to particular purposes) from the different question as to the possible range of usage of a 
word as determined solely on the basis of the word's meaning and what is involved in knowing 
that meaning (the second sense of extension, in which we look only to the basic linguistic 
specification and what that licenses). The first notion of extension is not linguistically 
determined. 
 In the second sense of extension, it is appropriate to describe what speakers know of 
substance words as determining the extension of the word.15 This is an attenuated notion of 
extension, in that it may not correspond to judgements about truth and falsity (or appropriateness) 
as determined on other grounds. 
 Taken in this attenuated sense, it may even be the case that for terms such as 'weasel' we 
can isolate a shared understanding (corresponding to a shared psychological state) that, in a sense, 
determines an extension. As a suggested description of a shared understanding of 'weasel', this 
could be something as simple as: small mammal of a distinct species that is named ‘weasel’. 
There are hints of a similar perspective in Millikan. She seems to indicate a required minimum 
when she says that a person may know as little as that malaria is a disease or that a weasel is a 
small mammal (1984, pp. 156–7; 2010, p. 70). With respect to what is linguistically licensed, the 
suggestion is that the extension of 'weasel' may be determined simply on the grounds of whatever 
usage the community happens to have alighted on. This will not in practice be arbitrary. 
Constraints are imposed by the shared understanding of 'mammal' and by the usage of related 																																																								
15 A referee raises the pertinent question: if we are allowing that an intension can determine an 
extension, does not this provide a diagnostic for all and only members, hence entail that chairs 
(etc.) are classes? The answer is yes, but two clarifying points need to be made. First, this 
observation arises only when we isolate a specifically linguistic level of analysis, in which we 
concentrate merely on the word 'chair' and its potential range of application. Actual use of a word 
is typically constrained by further factors. As a result, stating that 'chairs are a class' will be 
misleading, as this statement will typically be subject to further constraints on 'chair' that will 
undermine the reliability of the linguistically provided diagnostic. Second, as Millikan notes, 
being a class is consistent with also being a substance. 
	 18	
words such as 'stoat' and 'mink'. But this, clearly enough, does not provide a scientific criterion 
for isolating a particular species. By hypothesis, though, even if the word happens to be used by 
the community such that it is applied to examples that biologists come to decide do not count as 
weasels (or, conversely, if the community usage misses out on some examples that should count 
as weasels), this need not, by that fact, constitute a linguistic error; the 'error', as regarded by 
biologists, need not be regarded as a misunderstanding of the word by the community. 
 In summary, the suggestion is that the resources that language brings to bear at the 
individual word level for substance terms need not answer to projects aimed at delineating some 
privileged extension consisting only of items that 'really are' (or 'truly are') examples of such and 
such. What is known at the individual word level need not provide criteria able to give a final 
decision on these questions. We do not answer the broader questions by investigating what we 
know of the individual word used for those items. We can, though, legitimately talk of substance 
words as determining an extension when we restrict this to what is licensed purely on linguistic 
grounds, and we can relate this to a shared psychological state possessed by those who 'know the 
meaning' of a word.16 
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